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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we investigate a university network that uses Active Directory
as its authentication system. We get an understanding of the network by ana-
lyzing Windows event logs generated at Active Directory domain controllers.
We want to see what network activity looks like as a first step in identifying
and modeling network lateral movement. We characterize network activity,
access behavior, most frequent events encountered, and domain controller
usage. We find that the data, covering a week’s time, supports multiple
trends. The number of events encountered increases from morning to noon
and decreases after mid-afternoon. Weekend activity is lower than during
weekdays. Over the week of user-generated events, about 85% create 1,000
events or less. Less than 5% of users create more than 10,000 events. The top
five events encountered are associated with user sessions (i.e., login, logout,
authentication) or Kerberos ticket requests. Most events are generated at the
Urbana Domain Controllers. The second largest number of events (although
about 15 times smaller) are generated at the DCs that serve only WiFi and
VPN.
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For many sophisticated cyber attacks, breaching a network is only the first
step. Post-exploitation, an attacker may want to expand control to other net-
work resources [1, 2, 3]. In order to locate a target system and accomplish
its goal, an attacker relies on moving around in a network, undetected, until
the target is found. An adversary cannot always carry out a sophisticated
attack by directly compromising the target system. An attacker must in-
stead compromise one system on the network that is vulnerable, learn about
the breached network, look for vulnerabilites on other systems, and find and
compromise the target [4, 5, 6]. Trend Micro [5] organizes these network
attacks into 6 stages: Intelligence Gathering, Point of Entry, Command and
Control Communication, Lateral Movement, Maintenance, and Data Exfil-
tration. There is some overlap between the stages, and some stages might
involve repeating previous stages. In this thesis, we look specifically at the
threat of lateral movement. According to [5], the three goals of lateral move-
ment are:
1. obtain escalated privileges within the target network,
2. learn about the target network through observation, and
3. gain access to other machines within the network.
We focus our attention on the latter two goals.
For a defender, it is crucial to minimize and detect these types of attacks.
It can be difficult, however, to know if a stealthy adversary is moving around
in the network. One way for a defender to gain an advantage is by thoroughly
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knowing the network he is protecting. This becomes problematic when the
network has thousands or hundreds of thousands of nodes.
One approach is to actively monitor the network. The defender can build
a base-line for what would be considered normal behavior, and continue
to monitor for anomalies. If network activity deviates from expected, the
defender can investigate the cause of the alarm.
In order to study lateral movement, we want to first understand normal
user movement. In this thesis, we investigate a university network that uses
Active Directory as its authentication system. We get an understanding of
the network by analyzing user logins, logouts, usage patterns, and how Ker-
beros tickets are distributed. We investigate event logs produced at Active
Directory controllers to identify behavior. The behaviors we are interested
in include access patterns and usage distributions.
1.1.1 Active Directory
Active Directory (AD) is a Microsoft service for managing Windows domain
networks. Active Directory centralizes user and resource management. Net-
work administrators can add and modify information about users and groups,
computers and printers, and applications and services efficiently from the cen-
tral repository. This information can then be distributed and made available
for the network [7]. Network admins can allow a user to access resources with-
out individually configuring each resource. For example, a user is allowed to
log into any computer in a computer lab, and the admin does not have to
create a local account for the user at each computer. An Active Directory
Domain Services (AD DS) server is also called a domain controller. It is
the entity that authenticates and authorizes the users and computers on the
network, as well as enforcing their access policies. AD supports multiple pro-
tocols: DNS, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), and Kerberos.
LDAP is used primarily for internal AD processes such as clients download-
ing schemas and retrieving policies. Kerberos is a protocol for secure user
authentication, even on an insecure network [8, 9].
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1.1.2 Active Directory Authentication
Windows NT LAN Manager (NTLM) and Kerberos protocols can be used to
authenticate a user in Active Directory. Kerberos is the preferred method,
but cannot always be used. Kerberos cannot be used if a domain is running
Windows NT 4.0 or older, if the client is using an IP address to connect to
an AD service rather than a host name, if the client is accessing a resource
that is not a member of the AD domain, or if the resource does not support
the Kerberos protocol [10].
1.1.3 NTLM
NTLM is a challenge-response protocol for authenticating a user and a com-
puter. The NTLM protocol involves the use of LAN Manager (LM) hashes
and Windows NT (NT) hashes. Details about these hashes are explored
in [10, 11]. NTLM can be used to authenticate a local user account on a
computer or a domain account on a domain (such as through Active Direc-
tory) [12]. As of the release of Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2,
session security policy is set to require a 128-bit minimum encryption for
clients and servers [13]. Older versions of NTLM use 40-bit and 56-bit keys.
There are two versions of the protocol: interactive and noninteractive.
Interactive is used when the user wants to authenticate with a computer.
Noninteractive is when the user is already logged into the computer and wants
to access a resource. The following describes the “three-way handshake” for
the NTLM authentication protocol [14, 10, 15].
1. This step is exclusive to interactive authentication. The client wants
to access a computer. The client provides a domain name, username,
and password to a client computer. The password is hashed and the
original password is discarded.
2. The client requests a challenge from the authentication server, provid-
ing his username in plaintext.
3. The server creates a 16-byte random number to use as the challenge.
This challenge is sent to the client.
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4. The client receives the challenge and computes a response. The random
number is encrypted with the hashed password. The client sends the
response to the server.
5. The server receives the client’s challenge response. It then forwards
this response, the original challenge, and the username to the domain
controller (DC).
6. The domain controller has a database of usernames and password hashes.
The DC looks up the user’s stored hash and encrypts the challenge with
this hash. It then compares its result to the response that the user com-
puted. If they are the same, the user is successfully authenticated.
1.1.4 Kerberos
The Kerberos protocol for authentication involves three parties: a client, a
server (resource), and an authentication server called the Key Distribution
Center (KDC).
Kerberos relies on long-term and short-term cryptographic keys for en-
cryption and decryption. Long-term keys are used for verifying user, system,
and service identities. These keys are derived from passwords. When a user
account is created in Active Directory, a key, derived from their password, is
stored in a KDC database. When the user wants to log in, they supply their
password and the user key is created [9]. Short-term keys are used for com-
munication in which the session is not expected to last as long. As we will see
later, session keys that are used for temporary client-service communication
are short-term keys.
The KDC’s role is also to avoid each user needing to maintain keys for
each server, and for each server to maintain keys for each user. What follows
is the protocol for how a user obtains access to a network resource using
Kerberos version 5 [9]. This is also illustrated in Figure 1.1. Note that the
TGS is illustrated as running on the KDC, but this is not a requirement.
1. When the user wants to access a service, such as a network printer, the
user requests permission from the KDC to access the Ticket-Granting-
Server (TGS). When Kerberos Preauthentication is enabled, the user
sends his username and a timestamp encrypted with his own encryption
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Figure 1.1: Kerberos Protocol
key, the long-term key, as evidence of his identity [8]. The Kerberos
server looks up the client in its database (only checks if the client
exists). The KDC also has a copy of the user’s key in its database,
which it uses to decrypt the timestamp to verify the user’s identity.
If Preauthentication fails or is disabled, an alternative, similar step
takes place instead. The user first sends a request to the KDC that
initiates the authentication process. To confirm the user’s identity, the
KDC responds to the user with a message encrypted with the user’s
private key, which the KDC has on record. Only the user’s key can
decrypt this message. By decrypting this message and continuing with
the protocol, the KDC confirms the user owns his key, confirming his
identity. This completes the authentication step. The KDC also iden-
tifies if the user is authorized to use the requested resource through
permission policies.
2. A session key (SK1) is generated for use between the client and the
TGS. The Kerberos server responds to the client with two messages.
One message contains information about the TGS, a timestamp, a
ticket lifetime, and SK1, and is encrypted with the clients private key.
The second message is the TGT and contains the clients information,
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timestamp, network information, TGT lifetime, and SK1. The TGT is
encrypted with the TGS private key, which the client does not know.
The user must provide this TGT whenever he wants to request, from
the TGS, access to other network resources.
3. The client decrypts the message and recovers SK1. The client now
builds two messages to send to the TGS. It first builds a data structure
called the Authenticator, containing the clients information and times-
tamp. The first message contains unencrypted request information (the
desired resource) and requested lifetime of the ticket. The second mes-
sage contains the Authenticator, encrypted with KS1, and TGT, still
encrypted with the TGS private key (from the Kerberos authentication
server). The TGT is used to request service tickets (for services such
as Microsoft Exchange, network drives, or network printers [16]) from
the TGS. These two messages are sent to the TGS.
4. The TGS does a KDC database lookup to make sure the requested
service exists. The TGS uses its own private key to decrypt the TGT.
The TGT contains SK1, so the TGS now uses SK1 to decrypt the
Authenticator. Information from the Authenticator is validated with
the TGT. The TGS then generates a session key (SK2) for the client
and the resource to use. It sends two messages to the client: the first
contains SK2 and client information, and is encrypted with SK1. The
second is a resource service ticket that contains the clients information,
network information, timestamp, lifetime, and SK2, which is encrypted
with the resources private key. A service ticket is good only for the
particular service that was requested by the user. Whenever the user
wants to access the service for which the ticket is specified, the user
must provide this service ticket.
5. The client decrypts the client message with SK1 to obtain SK2. The
client is now ready to talk to the resource. It sends two messages: the
first is another Authenticator that contains the clients information and
timestamp, encrypted with SK2. The second message is the resource
service ticket obtained from the TGS (still encrypted with the resource
private key).
6. The resource essentially repeats the steps that the TGS performed. It
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decrypts the resource service ticket with its own private key to obtain
SK2. It uses SK2 to decrypt the Authenticator and validate the user’s
information. The service can use the contents of the decrypted service
ticket to confirm the user named in the ticket matches the user trying
to use the ticket. The client is now authenticated to use the resource.
7. The following steps are optional for Kerberos. The resource then sends
its own Authenticator message to the client to confirm its identity,
encrypted with SK2.
8. The client receives the resource’s Authenticator message, decrypts with
SK2, and can confirm that the resource is the intended resource. The
client now confirmed the identity of the service.
To summarize, the user password hash/key is used to obtain a TGT, a
TGT is used to obtain service tickets, and service tickets are used to gain
access to services.
The client caches the TGT and any resource tickets. TGTs and service
tickets have a default lifetime of 10 hours [8, 17, 18]. The client can then
check its cache for resource credentials (and if not found or expired, the TGT)
before going through the whole Kerberos protocol. From the perspective of
the client, the TGT is essentially just another ticket that allows access to
a resource. From the KDCs perspective, the TGT is a way to reduce the
number of ticket requests, and therefore reduce network communication and
processing.
1.2 Lateral Movement
Imagine a situation in which an attacker has gained access to one computer
on a network through some vulnerability (e.g., code injection attack) or user
error (e.g., malicious e-mail attachment). If the attacker wants to expand
his access, he may wish to gain access to other computers or resources in the
network. This is also known as network lateral movement. For example, the
attacker may be able to compromise a local account on a regular workstation.
That account might not have gone through the Kerberos protocol and gained
access to certain resources (i.e., possessing service tickets). Alternatively, the
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attacker may want to log into a particular resource using a particular account
(e.g., access a network folder as the user Dan Smith). There are multiple
attacks that can be performed to move laterally in a network.
What is the motivation for lateral movement? According to the works
of many security companies [4, 6, 19], lateral movement is useful to an
adversary for many reasons. They can gather information about a network
or systems on the network, gain access to specific files or credentials, and
even execute code on target systems. Lateral movement is an important step
for an adversary that has a specific long-term goal or a target that is hard-
to-reach from an outside network. Such an adversary could be an advanced
persistent threat (APT). An APT with sufficient resources and motivation
would be willing to infiltrate a network and move laterally until the desired
target system is found.
1.3 Attacks on Active Directory
1.3.1 Identity Snowball Attacks
Identity snowball attacks are a category of attacks that describe network lat-
eral movement. While not specific to Kerberos, an identity snowball attack,
as detailed in [20], is described as follows. An attacker leverages a user’s cre-
dentials to gain access to another resource, and the obtained resource allows
access to another resource, and those resources allow access to another re-
source, and so on. The first user’s credentials are obtained at a compromised
machine. The credentials obtained are at an elevated level such that access
to other resources is possible. For example, user Alice is a network admin-
istrator. Alice’s machine is compromised and her credentials are obtained
by an adversary. The adversary can now access Bob’s machine using Alice’s
credentials. Now Bob’s credentials are compromised by the adversary and
can be used to log into Carol’s machine. This repeats, and the adversary is
therefore moving laterally in the network.
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1.3.2 Pass the Hash Attack
User passwords are stored as a hash or a key, as described previously, and
kept in memory. This is to avoid the need to continually prompt the user for
a password on each Active Directory transmission, also called Single Sign-On
(SSO). The user can log in once using his password, and this information will
be kept in memory for a while without the user needing to reenter the pass-
word. The hashes in memory serve the same purpose as a password. From
an attacker’s perspective, obtaining a hash is nearly as good as obtaining a
plain text password. This is because a hash can be used to authenticate a
user, just like a password.
In a “pass-the-hash” attack, the attacker obtains a user’s password hash
and impersonates the user. If a user’s machine is compromised, the attacker
can read the user hash from memory. The hash can be obtained from the
Windows Local Security Authority (LSA) service. The LSA service han-
dles password hashes (such as NTLM hashes stored in the Security Accounts
Manager (SAM) and Kerberos hashes and tickets stored in a directory ser-
vices database). With administrative privilege, memory can be dumped from
these regions [21].
The attacker can store the retrieved hash in his own LSA, pretending to
be the user. The attacker can now follow the NTLM or Kerberos protocols
like normal. A TGT can be requested from the KDC, and service tickets can
be retrieved from the obtained TGT.
“Pass-the-hash” refers to using a recovered LM or NTLM hash, and “overpass-
the-hash,” also called “pass-the-key,” refers to using a recovered AES or RC4
key, but the concept of the attack is the same in either case. The user’s cre-
dentials are stolen and used to follow the Kerberos protocol to obtain a TGT
and possibly service tickets.
1.3.3 Pass the Ticket Attack
A ticket, whether crafted or obtained from memory, can be injected into the
current session. This means that the ticket is submitted to the TGS or to
the service in order to obtain access to the desired service. This behavior
is permitted and a Windows API call is available to perform this ticket
injection [22].
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The attacker can craft their own Kerberos tickets if the AD controller
or service is compromised. The attacker can use the stolen hash to create a
TGT. To craft a TGT, the hash would need to be obtained from the Kerberos
service account (krbtgt), which can be obtained from the LSA of the domain
controller. Alternatively (or in addition), the attacker could craft a service
ticket. To do this, the hash would need to be obtained from the service
account. Compromising the AD controller would be a best-case scenario for
the attacker, as private keys of user accounts and services would be accessible.
In this study, we focus our attention on what an attacker looks at in a network
prior to compromising an AD controller. We look at leaf nodes of a network,
which are workstations and services.
User Kerberos tickets (TGT and service tickets) are stored in memory.
This is to avoid continually going through the Kerberos protocol for every
request to use a network service. With administrative privilege, these tickets
can be read from memory. The attacker can inject an obtained ticket into
the current session. This means taking the recovered TGT or service ticket
and inserting it into the LSA (i.e., on a different computer). The attacker
needs to know the username associated with the injected ticket, as well. This
injection is done through a Windows API and does not require admin rights.
If the TGT is injected, the attacker can then request service tickets using the
TGT.
1.4 Research Questions
A future goal is to build models of how an attacker would move laterally in
the network. Before we can understand how an attacker can behave on the
network, we want to first understand how normal users behave. We want to
see what normal looks like on the network.
Active Directory controllers, TGSs, and Kerberos services log events and
network transactions. These logs are sent to an aggregation point where
they can be collected, stored, and later analyzed. We will analyze the logs
from Active Directory controllers that service network requests throughout
the entire university campus. Objectives of this research include:
1. Identify the number of unique users, recurrence of users, frequency of
users (frequency of logins)
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2. Characterize usage over time and where requests are served
3. Discover the number of TGTs and service tickets available
This research is significant because it provides security researchers a better
understanding of network usage on a university campus. University IT at
this campus can directly use this information to identify and investigate
anomolies or unexpected behavior we might find. Security researchers can
use the information provided to better understand large networks, including
usage patterns and frequency of events.
One of the goals of this work is to use the log data to better understand
the network. As a network defender, visualizing the log data is one way to
better understand network behavior and see patterns. A manager at the
Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center claims that defenders are at a security
disadvantage when they think of the network as a list rather than a graph
[23]. Having a list of systems to secure is useful, but it is also useful to
know how the systems are actively being used. It is easier to detect obvious
outliers if normal is well known. More detailed usage patterns are useful for
detecting more subtle lateral movement. We hope to provide these insights
throughout this thesis.
The described threats directly impact organizations, corporations, univer-
sities, and other entities that use internal networks running directory services.
1.5 Contributions
We analyzed Windows event logs produced at a university campus consisting
of over 44,000 students and an additional 5,000 faculty and staff [24]. This is
one of the largest studies we have seen in terms of user population [25, 26, 27].
The logs were over a week of network activity.
We characterized the activity we saw from users, services, and shares. We
described usage over a week, detailed usage based on event codes encountered,
looked at daily average usage, and discussed distribution across the domain
controllers. We repeat the previous analysis with the filtered data to gain
additional insight on network behavior without services and shares. We
provide additional insight to the university IT, Technology Services, about
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2.1 Machine Learning Detection
The author of [28] uses the network analyzer BRO to detect lateral movement
in a network. This work focuses on the Server Message Block (SMB) pro-
tocol, although one segment of the work focuses on detecting pass the hash
attacks. He uses machine learning to identify what normal and abnormal
behavior looks like, so that anomalies can be detected which could indicate
an attacker attempting to move laterally in a network. This work does not
cover the Kerberos protocol and therefore is lacking detection for pass the
ticket attacks. Further, the approach implements policies to protect against
these behaviors. This black-list approach is limited by how many attacks
and behaviors the defenders can think of. Results from a corporate network
dataset indicate that this identification is plausible with relatively low false
positives (one per hour).
DExtor [29] is a data mining network analyzer that focuses solely on de-
tecting code. It runs under the assumption that only data is transferred on
a network and code is malicious. They use machine learning to differentiate
data and code, and place the detector on a live network. DExtor works at the
application layer, which is also where Kerberos resides. Their tests indicate
high accuracy for detecting code in network traffic and low false positives. It
is uncertain if their approach can be performed in real-time. Unfortunately,
an attacker wishing to move laterally in a network using Kerberos will con-




APT-Hunter [30], on the other hand, helps security analysts detect legiti-
mate logins that are carried out by an adversary. APT-Hunter is a visual-
ization tool that analysts can use to identify lateral movement in the form
of legitimate-looking logins. It helps visualize links and login patterns that
are suspicious, such as desktop-to-desktop connections. In their study, two
analysts used APT-Hunter to identify 349 out of 749 total malicious logins
(done from a red team) with a false positive rate of 0.005%. This analysis
was done oﬄine, so the practicality of APT-Hunter in real-time is uncertain.
Further, while the study demonstrates some success, about 53% of malicious
logins were missed. With a large enterprise network, manual evaluation is
time and resource intensive.
The authors of [31] use reachability graphs to quantify the risk for threats
on a network. They calculate a metric as the likelihood that a graph node is
reachable from another graph node. Pass the hash is one example of threats
they say can potentially be predicted. They evaluate only the performance of
this system, so the practicality and accuracy of detection is unknown. This
strategy may be too simple by only identifying what nodes are at higher risk
based on how many other nodes it connects to. This assumption might not
hold true in enterprise networks when an adversary is more likely to target
client workstations rather than high-traffic servers.
The authors of [20] created a tool to help network administrators defend
their networks. Heat-ray combines machine learning, combinatorial optimiza-
tion, and attack graphs to help IT make decisions on how to manage their net-
work. They focus on minimizing identity snowball attacks. Heat-ray suggests
configurations that eliminate unnecessary network links, reviews the number
of users with escalated privileges, removes out-of-date privileges, removes
group privilege assignments that are no longer needed or over-encompassing,
prevents high-privilege accounts from unnecessary logins, and secures auto-
mated script execution. It attempts to do all this while not preventing users
from accomplishing their tasks. Their evaluation demonstrates that using
Heat-ray to help configure a network reduces the number of identity snow-
ball attacks by 96%. This is a measure of the number of machines (out of
1,000) that are reachable and can be compromised before applying Heat-ray
and after multiple iterations of Heat-ray.
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2.3 Mobility
The authors of [32] examine user movement with cell phone records. They
suggest that user predictability follows a fat-tailed distribution. This means
that users that travel less should be easier to predict and those that travel
farther are less predictable. Said differently, the entropy is higher for those
that regularly travel farther. They also point out that there is a threshold
(they find to be 10 km) in which all users after this point are about equally
predictable, although less predictable than lower distances. They indicate
that there is a potential 93% average predictability in user mobility. They
do not find any factors such as demographic, age, gender, or even weekend
to weekday comparisons to be factors in predictability.
The authors of [33] look at wireless access point data gathered during an
ACM conference. They have data from four APs located in each corner of an
auditorium. They are able to correlate data with the events of the conference
schedule. With respect to user mobility, they determine the number of access
points visited and the number of access point handoffs that occur. They
notice fewer APs visited on the half day of events when compared to the
days that had full schedules, indicating less user roaming. The number of
AP handoffs over time also indicates points throughout the day when users
were not moving and started moving, which they correlated with breaks
between conference talks.
Others have done characterization of larger wireless networks. [25] looks
at 476 access points spread across 161 buildings, but only identifies 1706
unique wireless users (unique MAC addresses). They gather data using sys-
log, SNMP polling, and tcpdump. In 2008, the “largest WLAN study to
date” [27] examined 7000 users across 550 access points. This study also uses
syslog, SNMP polling, and tcpdump captures, as well as telephone (VoIP)
records. They obtain 32,747,757 syslog messages, 16,868,747 SNMP polls,
and 4.6 TB of sniffed traffic.
Most of the prior work that uses wireless access point traffic either needs
data that must be gathered on demand for desired experiments (additional
logging software, hardware, sniffers, etc.) or configuring access points to
save copies of packet traffic. Network packets are less descriptive than event
logs at an application level, although may contain other useful lower level
information. For example, we might not be able to tell that the packet is a
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TGT request, but we can instead know the client IP/MAC addresses, access
point IP/MAC addresses, and signal-to-noise ratio.
We also notice that results seem in conflict across different research studies.
[27] and [26], for example, see much different mobility patterns. Henderson
et al. see most of the users spending a vast majority of time staying at
the same access point, while Balazinska and Castro see more mobile users.
Interestingly, the campus environment was observed to have less mobile users
compared to the corporate environment. Mobility patterns are likely to vary
for differing campuses ( e.g., business vs. college) but past work indicates
the patterns may not be obvious or intuitive.
We investigate an alternative approach that takes advantage of existing
logging architecture. Windows event logs are generated at Active Directory
controllers when users request Kerberos TGTs, request Kerberos service tick-
ets, or log into wireless access points, among other triggers. This is a common
procedure for IT departments for security purposes. These logs are already
being gathered for the purpose of security auditing, so we attempt to reuse
them to answer mobility questions.
Across mobility papers, we find that the common areas of interest are:
1. Number of users/connections over time
2. Average number of users at an access point over time
3. Amount of data transferred
We are not working directly with access point logs or packet captures,
unlike these papers. We must translate these important considerations into
the paradigm we are working with:
1. Number of users/connections over time
2. Average number of users at a domain controller over time





Imagine a situation exists in which an attacker has gained access to one com-
puter on a network through some vulnerability (e.g., code injection attack)
or user error (e.g., malicious e-mail attachment). If the attacker wants to
expand his access, he may wish to gain access to other computers or re-
sources in the network. This is also known as network lateral movement. For
example, the attacker may be able to compromise a local account on a reg-
ular workstation. That account might not have gone through the Kerberos
protocol and gained access to certain resources (i.e., possessing service tick-
ets). Alternatively, the attacker may want to log into a particular resource
using a particular account (e.g., access a network folder as the user “Dan
Smith”). There are multiple attacks that can be performed to move laterally
in a network.
We are building models of user behavior on a campus network. Before we
can model lateral movement in the context of what an attacker is capable of,
we first look at what we should expect from regular movement.
Active Directory controllers, TGSs, and Kerberos services all log network
events. These logs are sent to an aggregation point where they can be col-
lected, stored, and later analyzed. In this study, we look at event logs gen-
erated from Active Directory controllers. In the future, we want to also look
at TGS and Kerberos service logs.
3.1.1 Collaboration
We collaborated with Technology Services at the University of Illinois Urbana-
Champaign to obtain Active Directory data logs. Technology Services ad-
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ministers Active Directory domain controllers and some services that use
Kerberos authentication.
3.1.2 Institutional Review Board
This study involved collecting data of human subjects, so it was our obliga-
tion to take every necessary precaution to ensure subject privacy and ethical
data collection. We submitted a New Protocol Application to the University
Institutional Review Board (IRB). This “Application for Review of Research
Involving Human Subjects” described the study in detail and outlined the
precautions we took to ensure responsible and ethical collection, handling,
and storage of user data. These precautions are described next.
3.2 Ethics
3.2.1 Privacy Safeguards
Logs gathered contain account names (NetID), host names, client computer
names, client network addresses, Kerberos session information (event codes,
error codes, encryption type), and timestamps.
Usernames, client computer names, and potentially client network ad-
dresses are user-identifying information and were anonymized. These fields
were replaced with a number chosen from the space of all numbers such that
for each username, its corresponding random number will always be the same.
Additionally, we could not map any corresponding random number back to
its original data without a key that is held solely by Technology Services. To
be more specific, we used a keyed hash algorithm that is constructed from
the 256-bit Secure Hash Algorithm (HMAC-SHA256) [34]. In other words,
username data is unique so that we can differentiate between users, but it is
not possible to identify a username based on a hashed username. Further, we
did not circumvent these protections by attempting to re-identify the users.
The key is held by Technology Services, meaning we did not have the ability
to de-anonymize users.
The anonymized data was periodically uploaded to an aggregation point.
The aggregation point is a Technology Services-administered shared Box di-
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rectory. Box is a service for sharing files, and is approved by the university
of storage of FERPA sensitive data [35]. This was where all the logs were
collected and combined. We then synchronized data from the shared Box di-
rectory with our Network and Security Research Group (NSRG) server. The
data transfer took place over HTTPS. This provided an encrypted, secure
channel of communication for the anonymized data. The NSRG server did
not communicate with the workstations, AD controllers, or services.
The NSRG server is located in the Advanced Computation Building (ACB).
Data resides on a Virtualized Machine running on the server. Data handling
risks were severely curtailed through the use of best practices in securing the
collection infrastructure and processing machines. These include, but are
not limited to: locked office, restricted access, restrictions on copying study-
related materials, access rights terminated when authorized users leave the
project or unit, individual ID plus password protection, encryption of digital
data, network restrictions, no non-UM devices used to access project data,
security software (firewall, anti-virus, anti-intrusion) installed and regularly
updated on all servers, workstations, laptops, and other devices used in the
project. All data storage and processing occurred on the NSRG server, and
the anonymized data did not leave the server, except in aggregated form for
research presentation.
The participants accessed Technology Services-administered computers and
performed their intended tasks as normal. This includes, but is not limited to,
working on homework, writing papers, programming, using network printers,
checking personal and university emails, web browsing, and playing games.
We did not interfere with participants’ computer usage and our data gather-
ing was transparent to the user. This is identical to how Technology Services
currently gathers data about user activities for network security purposes.
3.2.2 Risk Analysis
We believe the users would experience minimal distress if they discovered that
their usage was monitored. We believe this because Technology Services-
administered computers are identified as systems that are being actively
monitored for analytics and security purposes. The collection process was
transparent to the users and did not cause undue stress on their computing
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needs.
We believed the risks involved were minimal. The data gathered was
anonymized and stored on a secure NSRG server. If it were to be leaked,
individuals and personal information would not be revealed. We did not ex-
pect participants to feel any additional psychological stress that they would
not otherwise undergo from standard IT data logging.
We believed that the potential benefits of this research were significant.
We were able to quantify the opportunities an attacker has while attempting
to move laterally in a network. This was determined by identifying how many
resources an attacker would have available that can be used to gain access
to additional network resources. It provides cyber security researchers and
Information Technology personnel with insight on how attackers can navigate
a compromised network and what network resources can be targeted. These
insights could help in threat mitigation, recovering from compromises, and
identifying if an attacker is moving around in an internal network. These
threats directly impact organizations, corporations, universities, and other
entities that use internal networks.
3.2.3 Log Contents
We needed to know the exact contents of the logs we would be analyzing. We
also needed to determine which fields in the log contained revealing informa-
tion that must be anonymized. We received a sample log from Technology
Services. This log contained information from only our NSRG lab volunteers.
Details about the log content, including descriptions of each field and event
code translations, can be found in Appendix A.
3.3 Process
3.3.1 Data Gathering Process
Data was collected from Technology Services Active Directory (AD) con-
trollers and workstations. Data collection tools (i.e., AD service logging) are
running on the AD controllers and workstations that collect data and store
them in logs. Details about all the log fields are provided in Table A.1.
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Usernames, client computer names, and potentially client network addresses
are user-identifying information and were anonymized by being replaced with
an HMAC-SHA256 hash [34]. To reiterate, username data was unique so
that we can differentiate between users, but it was not possible to identify a
username based on a hashed username.
The anonymized data was periodically uploaded to the NSRG server through
the process previously described. The data was uploaded to a shared Box
directory, and downloaded from Box to the NSRG server.
3.3.2 Anonymization Pre-Processing
The logs generated will contain sensitive information, which means that
anonymization must take place before we receive the data. Anonymization
must occur at a Technology Services computer prior to being transmitted
to the NSRG server. We took this into consideration when developing the
anonymization technique. We wanted to minimize inconvenience and man-
ual labor, and maximize the data acquired. We wrote scripts to anonymize
sensitive fields, which would be used in an automated process. This reduces
inconvenience and manual labor. We also wanted to minimize inconvenience
by not imposing any unrealistic requirements on Technology Services to run
our script.
The script reads in the CSV log, anonymizes sensitive fields, and saves the
result. As mentioned previously, the fields we consider sensitive are those
that contain information that could be considered identifying. In these logs,
we anonymize fields that contain NetIDs, IP addresses, and device names.
Fields that contain only a NetID or IP address, such as “Account Name,”
“Logon Account,” and “Client Address,” are anonymized using the HMAC-
SHA256 keyed hash function. We anonymize the field “Source Workstation”
more tactically. This field may contain information about the source de-
vice that generated the log, such as a MacBook Pro or iPhone. It also
may contain identifying information about the owner of the device. For ex-
ample, our sample logs contained the entry “Zanes-MacBook-Pro-2.local”
which identifies one of our volunteer’s devices but also his first name. We
used the sample logs to identify patterns to look for when parsing the logs.
In the anonymization script, we used regular expressions (regex) to match
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these patterns. When a pattern was matched, we stripped any information
that could be considered sensitive and left only the pattern. For example,
“Zanes-MacBook-Pro-2.local” would become “MacBook-Pro.” This removes
user privacy concerns, but allows us to gather statistics about what devices
are used on the network. We took the safest approach if a pattern was not
matched. If we could not identify the contents of the Source Workstation
field, we HMAC-SHA256 hashed the entire field. We chose to do this to
ensure no sensitive information would be revealed in the case that we en-
counter a device that we did not account for. This field is also self-reporting,
according to Technology Services. Therefore, we were conservative with this
field because it could contain anything the computer or user chose to label
itself as.
Our first attempt used PowerShell 5.1. We chose PowerShell because it
is installed on Windows computers by default, which is what Technology
Services uses. Therefore, no additional installations or setup were necessary.
We discovered, however, that PowerShell was not practical for pre-processing
data fast enough or at the scale we were working with. In a test environment
using a 700 MB log sample, the PowerShell script took 1 minute 53 seconds to
read the file into memory, 1 minute 35 seconds to perform anonymization, and
55 seconds to write the final data to disk. The script memory consumption
was also not practical for data logs of the size we expected. PowerShell used
approximately 10 GB of RAM to import the 700 MB log file into memory.
We speculated the memory usage was much more than the size of the file
because the PowerShell “import-csv” command-let generates a dictionary-
like data structure. We predict PowerShell uses a substantial amount of
memory for CSV metadata. This was with a 700 MB file, but the practical
performance would be worse than this because the actual logs were many
gigabytes in size.
We gave the PowerShell script to Technology Services to test performance
and verify functionality. They ran the script on two log samples. The first was
a sample over a 5-minute period and was about 118 MB. The anonymization
script completed in about 4 minutes 22 seconds. The read, anonymize, and
write functionality was timed, as well. Importing the CSV took about 1
minute 35 seconds, anonymization took about 2 minutes 32 seconds, and
writing the anonymized data took about 15 seconds.
The second sample was over a 30-minute period and was about 711 MB.
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PowerShell was processing this log for over 22 hours before being cancelled.
Importing the CSV took about 8 hours 47 minutes 3 seconds. It was in the
process of anonymizing before being cancelled.
We created multiple variants of the script which incorporated paralleliza-
tion, reading the log as a stream, and reading the log in chunks. All variants
had worse performance than the first version.
We used the PowerShell script as a template and wrote a Python 2.7
version of the anonymization script. Running the first draft, unoptimized
Python script on the previous 700 MB log sample resulted in a start-to-finish
time of about 90 seconds. The substantial difference between this result and
the PowerShell results caused us to re-evaluate the anonymization approach.
Some amount of setup or installation would be worth the gained performance
benefits from using an alternative scripting language.
Table 3.1 displays the start-to-finish run times of some of the scripts we
created. All the run times shown are for a 3 MB log sample. PowerShell Stan-
dard reads the entire CSV into memory using the “import-csv” command-let,
performs anonymization to the data in memory, and then writes the data
back using the “export-csv” command-let. PowerShell Stream-Read reads
and anonymizes the file one line at a time, rather than importing the entire
CSV into memory. It then writes back using the “export-csv” command-let.
PowerShell Batched and Parallelized X reads in X lines of the file, starts a
new thread to perform anonymization on those X lines, and then writes the
anonymized data back as a new, smaller CSV. Python Read Then Write reads
and anonymizes the file one line at a time, keeping the contents in memory,
and then writes back to disk. Python Read-Anonymize-Write-Repeat reads
and anonymizes the file one line at a time. After it reaches a threshold of
10,000 lines, it writes the anonymized lines to disk. It therefore only keeps
10,000 lines worth of log contents in memory at a time. The significant per-
formance difference we observed between PowerShell and Python, both in
Technology Service’s test run and our own testing, motivated us to switch to
Python.
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Table 3.1: Script Run-Times
Script Description Run-Time (seconds)
PowerShell 1.178
PowerShell Batched and Parallelized 500 4.291
PowerShell Batched and Parallelized 1,000 3.665
PowerShell Batched and Parallelized 10,000 3.920
PowerShell Batched and Parallelized 100,000 3.893
Python Read Then Write 0.440
Python Read-Anonymize-Write-Repeat 0.188
3.3.3 Transferring Data
Once the data has gone through anonymization pre-processing, it is ready
to be sent to the NSRG server. The anonymized data will be periodically
uploaded to a Technology Services-administered shared Box directory. This
is where all the anonymized logs will be collected and stored. We then syn-
chronize data from the shared Box directory with our Network and Security
Research Group (NSRG) server.
We wrote a Python script to automatically copy files from the shared Box
directory to the NSRG server. The script uses the official Box Python SDK
[36]. This uses the Box API to authenticate, copy, and delete. The script
authenticates as a user client and copies all files from the shared Box directory
to the NSRG server. When the files copies are complete, we then delete the
copied files from the Box directory. We do this to save space in Box (a
log over an eight hour period can be 3 GB or more). These data transfers
take place over HTTPS. Once on the NSRG server, the data is ready to be
processed.
3.3.4 Data Processing
All post-anonymization processing was done on the NSRG server. The server
has 128 GB of RAM and 32 logical processing cores. Statistics gathering
and graph generation were done using Python 3, particularly the numpy,
matplotlib, and scipy packages [37, 38, 39].
Every entry has a timestamp (“ time”) and one of two name fields will
be used. If an anonymized username is present, it will be in either the
“Account Name” field or the “Logon Account” field. Which field has the
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username depends on the type of event that is logged. We have observed that
when a username is in the “Logon Account” field, it is primarily for event
code 4776. We will discuss event codes more later. This event states that
“the domain controller attempted to validate the credentials for an account”
[40]. All other events that use a username field have the username in the
“Account Name” field. Another event code of interest is 4768: “A Kerberos
authentication ticket (TGT) was requested” [40]. Two more event codes
that will be important when looking at user activity are 4634 (“An account
was logged off”) and 4624 (“An account was successfully logged on”) [40].
The first iteration of the Python script was single-threaded with little
consideration put into memory consumption. This worked fine on a 5-minute
sample log we initially received from Technology Services. Once we received
logs covering 24 hours of activity at a time, our script was no longer practical.
The script was using all 128 GB of memory and disk swap memory was
continuing to increase.
We had to optimize the script to handle the amount of data we were dealing
with. The first iteration read every line of the CSV into a list. Each entry
in the list was a dictionary. The dictionary keys were the field names (e.g.,
Account Name, EventCode, etc.) and those mapped to the corresponding
fields’ values. This method was not feasible for even 24 hours of log data
at a time, let alone a week’s worth of data that we would later be handling.
These logs for one day were about 25-30 GB in total.
We overcame this by parallelizing the Python script. The revamped script
reads every log file in a given directory into memory simultaneously (up
to the number of cores available). Instead of saving a list of dictionaries
for all the data, we are more selective about the data we look at. With
each simultaneous file read, we build dictionaries of only information we
are interested in. For example, we want to look at the number of users we
encounter in the logs. We go through each line of each CSV (in parallel) and
make a dictionary of usernames. The usernames are the key and the value is
the number of times this user was encountered.
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3.4 Log Analysis
The anonymization script hashes usernames, but we want to ensure the same
username results in the same hash even if the field is formatted differently.
The script attempts to pull NetIDs out of username fields of various for-
mats. We use regular expressions to match all possible formats from the
sample set we obtained from Technology Services. For example, in the sam-
ple data of only our information, there are fields such as “CITES-IDM TDI
user\nCN=<NETID>,OU=People,DC=ad,DC=uillinois,DC=edu” where
<NETID> would be filled with a user NetID. We worked with Technology
Services to identify all patterns we might encounter, but we cannot guarantee
all of them are accounted for.
In the first iteration of data anonymization and analysis, we do not dis-
tinguish between users, services, and network shares. This was primarily
because we did not see services and shares in our sample log. We were un-
aware that they would be included in the live anonymized logs, let alone their
username patterns.
One of the first things we want to look at is usage patterns. We expect to
see periods of time with little activity, such as early in the morning (midnight
to 6am) before students and faculty arrive. We then expect to see an increase
of activity in the morning as students are waking up and faculty arrive. We
expect relatively steady activity throughout the day as students go to class,
others get out of class, and students and faculty use the internet throughout
the day. We expect a slight decline in the late afternoon or early evening
as faculty leave work for the day. We suggest a slight change because the
student population (about 44,000) is over eight times larger than the faculty
and staff population (about 5,000) [24].
We also speculate that Monday and Wednesday will have similar patterns,
and Tuesday and Thursday will look similar. Classes at UIUC are typically
scheduled at the same time on these day pairs. Therefore, we predict that
similar usage patterns will result from similar student class attendance pat-
terns.
We look at log data covering a week of events from November 1st to Novem-
ber 6th. These logs were a total of about 220 GB.
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3.4.1 Events
We are working with Windows event logs that are generated at Active Di-
rectory controllers. Each log entry has an event code describing what event
occurred. We should therefore investigate what events we are encountering
most. Table A.2 contains descriptions of each event code encountered. Ta-
ble B.1 shows statistics about all event codes from all user activity over the
entire data set. The top five event codes produced are 4624, 4634, 4776, and
4768. All of these events are related to a user logging in (or out). As a sanity
check, we see that events 4624 and 4634 are roughly equivalent. The total
number of account logins and log outs are about the same. From this we
can say that top events we encounter are for user authentication. The event
code descriptions for the top ten events sorted by total number of events are
in Table 3.2.
We can identify from this table some of the answers we seek. First we look
at TGT distribution. Event code 4768 is described as “a Kerberos authen-
tication ticket (TGT) was requested.” There were 46,717,178 total TGT
request events and 6,830,640 unique user TGT request events throughout
the week. This comes to about 6.8 TGTs per user if we assume a uniform
distribution.
Event code 4769, “A Kerberos service ticket was requested,” occurs 3,891,719
times. These events occur from 404 unique users. This comes out to about
9633 service tickets requested per user given a uniform distribution. We do
not currently possess information in the logs that identifies the service, but
it is intended for future work.
The next event, 4776, is described as “the domain controller attempted to
validate the credentials for an account.” From discussions with Technology
Services, we know that these events occur as a result of an NTLM authen-
tication. There were 95,899,306 total NTLM authentications and 4,640,444
unique user NTLM authentications. This becomes about 20.66 NTLM au-
thentications per user assuming a uniform distribution.
We also see some event codes that correspond to administrative tasks, such
as event 4672 and 5136. We take a closer look at these events later.
We want to look also at event codes produced from unique users. Perhaps
users have misconfigured hardware or software. Maybe some are having
connection or authentication problems. There could also be automated tasks
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Table 3.2: Top 10 EventCode Descriptions Sorted by Total Connections
Event Code Description
4624 An account was successfully logged on
4634 An account was logged off
4776 The domain controller attempted to validate the
credentials for an account
4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was re-
quested
4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon
4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed
4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentials
4769 A Kerberos service ticket was requested
5136 A directory service object was modified
4625 An account failed to log on
that rapidly log in and out. In an attempt to reduce these events, we look
at event codes per user. In other words, a user account only contributes one
count for any events they produced. The event code descriptions for the top
ten events sorted by unique users are in Table 3.3.
We see many of the same events top this chart. Login (4624) and log off
(4634) are about the same again. According to [40], log off events are not
properly logged by Windows until the system restarts. They further say that
a logoff event may not be recorded if there is an unexpected shutdown or
loss of network connection. These seem to be likely explanations for the two
events not being exactly the same.
When we compare the top contributors in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 (or the
numbers in Appendix B.1), we see that NTLM authentication events are a
larger percentage of the total events compared to the unique events. This
indicates that accounts are issuing 4776 NTLMauthentication events more
frequently than the other login/logoff events.
Table 3.4 shows how many instances of each event code were found without
a username associated with the event. Event codes that do not have missing
usernames are not listed. Over 31% of login and logout events are without
a username. Almost 90% of “special privileges assigned to new logon” do
not contain a username. About 65% of “a privileged service was called” are
without a username, too. As we will see later, a subset of administrative
tasks leave the username field empty.
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Table 3.3: Top Ten EventCode Descriptions Sorted by Users
Event Code Description
4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was re-
quested
4624 An account was successfully logged on
4634 An account was logged off
4776 The domain controller attempted to validate the
credentials for an account
4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed
4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentials
4756 A member was added to a security-enabled uni-
versal group
4732 A member was added to a security-enabled local
group
4733 A member was removed from a security-enabled
local group
4625 An account failed to log on
Table 3.4: Number of EventCodes that Appear with Empty String
Username










We next characterize user activity over time. We look at event log data
covering a week’s time. Figure 3.1 shows total user activity from midnight
on November 1st to midnight November 7th. Activity is grouped into one
hour bins. This total activity includes events that the same user may have
produced within the bin. We see a pattern of lower activity in the early
morning, increasing activity over the day that peaks around noon, followed
by decreasing activity throughout the rest of the day. There are spikes of
extremely high activity at about 2am every day. There is also an extreme





























































1e7 All User Activity Over Time
Figure 3.1: User Activity over Time
To avoid a few power-users from distorting the graph, we also look at
unique activity. Figure 3.2 shows unique user activity over the same time
period. Activity is again grouped into one hour bins. This unique activity
includes events produced by unique individuals only. Even if the same user
produced multiple events within the bin, it is counted as one event. We
immediately see a difference in the magnitude of activity. Total non-unique
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user events reached almost 10 million in one hour. The unique graph shows
activity maxing out at no more than 120,000 events in an hour. This indicates
that there are users producing many events per hour. The reoccurring 2am
spikes are no longer obvious in this view. We can see defined peaks for
each day. Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Monday have about the same
magnitude. Saturday and Sunday clearly have fewer events being produced.
Contrary to what we predicted, Monday and Wednesday do not have obvious































































All Unique User Activity Over Time
Figure 3.2: Unique User Activity over Time
Figure 3.3 shows the top five most seen event codes over time. Figure 3.4
shows the next five most frequent event codes over time. These are broken
up to make it easier to read. Please refer back to Table 3.2 for the top ten
event code descriptions. From these we can see what specific events causes
the activity we previously saw.
Table C.1 in Appendix C lists the correlation coefficients calculated be-
tween each event code pair. We focus on the top ten events for identifying
correlation.
We see from the pattern of 4768 that TGTs are requested at a steady
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rate, increasing from early morning to mid-afternoon each day and gradually
decreasing as the day goes on. Event 4776 (the domain controller attempted
to validate the credentials for an account) occurs more frequently and in a
more bursty pattern, but still following the trend of increasing to noon and
decreasing after. Event 4776 activity is also lower on Saturday, then spiking
to a weekly high Sunday after midnight.
The lines for 4634 (an account was logged off) and 4624 (an account was
successfully logged on) are so similar that they are merged together on the
graph. These two events have a correlation coefficient of 0.999. The one hour
binning we did indicates that the logins and logouts are occurring within the
same hour.
Event 4624 (logged in) and event 4776 (DC attempted to validate creden-
tials) have a correlation coefficient of 0.586. Looking at Figure 3.3, we see
that when one of them spikes, they spike together, but in non-spiking situa-
tions, their patterns do not mirror. Possibly a subset of logins are followed
by credential validation. Since events 4624 and 4634 are so closely correlated,
4776 also has a correlation coefficient of 0.586 with event 4634.
Event 4776 (DC attempted to validate credentials) and event 4768 (TGT
requested) have a correlation coefficient of 0.676. Event 4776 has a correlation
coefficient of 0.628 with event 4769 (Kerberos service ticket was requested),
which is shown in Figure 3.4. While they do not have the same magnitude,
they follow the same trend of increasing from morning to mid-afternoon,
followed by decreasing.
Events 4768 and 4769 have a correlation coefficient of 0.803. This again
appears to be the situation where they have differing magnitudes (about 5
times magnitude difference) but similar temporal trends.
Events 4624, 4634, and 4672 (Special privileges assigned to new logon)
have a correlation coefficient of 0.868. This event will not give us much
information about user usage, according to Technology Services, as it is an
administrative event. This can still imply that a portion of the login and
logout events are related to these 4672 administrative events.
We investigate now the uncharacteristic spike that occurs in Figure 3.1
on 11-01 at about 11am. If we look at Figures 3.3 and 3.4, we see there is
a correlation between events 4624, 4634, 4672, and 4776. There are about
2.6 million events occurring for each of 4624 and 4634 within the one hour.
There are about 1.9 million events for 4672 in that same hour. There are also
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about 1.4 million 4776 events that contribute to the spike. In addition, there
are 1.9 million events during that hour that have the same “Source Network
Address” (i.e., IP address). There are also 1.9 million events during the
hour that originate from a single username. An additional 1.5 million events
originate from a single, different username. This indicates that one or more
administrative accounts are logging in, performing an action that is assigning
a special privilege to a new logon, and then logging off. We say that this is
an administrative account because only an account with escalated privilege











































































Figure 3.3: Top 5 Event Codes over Time
We next investigate the spikes occuring at 2am every day. Looking at
Figure 3.4 reveals the event code primarily involved in the 2am spikes.
Event 4648 (A logon was attempted using explicit credentials) has a small
amount of consistent activity every day, along with one burst of activity at
about 2am every day. This event could also be connected to the spikes we see
in Figure 3.3 that also occur at about 2am. The spikes are less apparent in
the latter graph due to the magnitudes of the other activities. Upon further
inspection, we see the 2am bursts consist of events 4776, 4624, and 4648.
The event code descriptions and repeated time indicate this is a scheduled,
automated task. We return to investigate this reoccurring pattern shortly.
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Event 4771 could be an interesting event for IT to follow. The description
reads that a “Kerberos pre-authentication failed.” There is a consistent level
of these events that occur throughout the week. Some amount of these events












































































Figure 3.4: Top 6-10 Event Codes over Time
To make any daily repeating patterns clear, we now look at hourly usage
graphs averaged over the week. This means taking the average of user activity
per hour across each day. For example, 9:00 on the graph is the activity at
9:00 averaged across every day of the week. This is illustrated in Figure
3.5. The graph reiterates the daily patterns we previously saw, consisting of
activity increasing from early morning to about noon, followed by decreasing
activity. The average barely falls below 2 million events per hour at its
lowest points. There is a high point early in the morning at about 2am,
corresponding to the daily peaks we saw previously.
We look at the daily averaged events triggered by unique users once again.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.6. In doing so, we see that the spike at 2am
is gone. We speculated this could be some automated event that causes
a sudden spike of network event activity. We reached out to Technology
Services about this spike. They identified the source of the 2am activity
to be a service account in an IT networking department. They suggested
34
















Figure 3.5: Average Daily Activity
that this could be “a nightly firmware check or log maintenance on all the
networking switches on campus.” Unique user activity per hour ranges from
about 60,000 to over 90,000 events through the day. The unique login graph
has been smoothed in comparison to the total login graph.
We found a total of 302,510 unique users. The maximum number of events
created with the same user is 69,847,763. Upon further investigation, this
is actually an empty string username. This means that these are all of the
combined events for when a username is not present. This is most likely
many users. The second highest number of events is produced by a non-
empty string username. This account produced 11,151,510 events.
Next we look at the frequency of user activity. Figure 3.7 shows the CDF
of user events over the week. On the x axis is a log-scale of the number of
times a user creates an event. On the y axis is the frequency of events. The
markers are every 10%. This tells us that about 5% of all users only create
one event. About 50% of users create 100 events or less. About 70% of users
create 1,000 events or less. Over 95% of users create 10,000 events or less.
Figure 3.8 shows the PDF of user events over the week as a scatter plot.
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Average Daily Unique User Activity
Figure 3.6: Average Unique Daily Activity
The y axis is the number of times a user performs an event. The x axis is the
number of users that performed y number of events. Note that both axes are
log scaled. This plot resembles an exponential decay in the number of events
performed by users. The outliers are on the left end of the x axis. These
individual users are the source of far more events than the rest of the users.
3.4.3 User Distribution across Domain Controllers
We next characterize user activity distributed across the campus domain
controllers. We want to look at how many events are hitting each domain
controller (also called a “host” in the logs) over time. Figure 3.9 shows
the total number of events that target each domain controller over the week.
Figure 3.10 illustrates the same but limited to unique users. Both graphs
are binned into 24 hour periods.
There are two Amazon Web Services domain controllers (AWSDC), two
Chicago Domain Controllers (CDC), three RADIUS servers, and six Ur-
bana Domain Controllers (UDC). The CDCs serve infrastructure primarily
36
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CDF of Num Times All Users Perform Event
Figure 3.7: CDF of Number of Times All Users Login
in Chicago, where they are located, but not exclusively. They can still be
reached from Urbana if a user explicitly tries to. The AWS DCs are for
university AWS resources to use rather than connecting to a DC on campus.
The Radius servers are used exclusively for Radius authentication, which
are VPN connections and IllinoisNet WiFi connections. Of the three Radius
servers, two are virtual machines (VMs) running on VMWare infrastructure
in Urbana, and the third is a VM running on infrastructure in Chicago. All
other traffic is served to the UDCs, located across the Urbana UIUC campus.
The majority of all traffic we see is going through the UDCs each day.
When considering only unique users, we see the same usage primarily through
the UDCs. When we compare the total and the unique, we notice that total
AWSDC and CDC traffic appears to be originating from fewer individuals.
This is because there are fewer unique user events and a larger number of
total events for these two DC groups.
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Figure 3.10: Number of Events From Unique Users at Each DC per Day
3.4.4 Filtering the Data
After discovering the source of the 2am spikes, we requested non-user-identifying
information from Technology Services about the accounts that are the source
of most events. They investigated between 11-01 and 11-06, and gave us de-
scriptions of the top 20 users based on events produced. Table 3.5 shows these
sources. We note that because of the anonymization process, we do not see
the numbers match up exactly. We believe this is because of the grouping
that occurs while anonymizing. That is, we might have fewer events linked
to individual users because the usernames may not have been pulled out of
the username field correctly. This is because we cannot guarantee we know
all username patterns that exist. Technology Services knows the exact user
that produced each event.
We now look at a second iteration of data anonymization and analysis.
This time, we filter out services and network shares. Technology Services
informed us that shares always have a dollar sign ($) and services are sup-
posed to have a hyphen (-) in the name. We modify our regexes to account for
these. We check if the username field is a share that includes a username. For
example, “UDC02$\n<NETID>” where <NETID> is the NetID of a user
that might be logging in and authenticating with domain controller UDC02.
If it has the format of only a share with no username (e.g., “UDC02$”), we
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Table 3.5: Top 20 Sources of Events Over the Week






















do not keep this event entry. If we find a hyphen in the username field, we
do not keep this event entry, either. These efforts were additional attempts
to filter out events that are automated or do not correctly represent a user-
triggered action. We are now looking at information which we believe is more
representative of user activity only.
We expect to see a smaller magnitude of events. If the reoccurring spikes
are caused by service and/or share accounts, we also expect to see less spikes
in the new set.
We first look at the event codes to get an idea of if or how the data we
are about to examine might look differently. Table B.2 contains the event
codes, total number of each event, total users that generated the event, and
connections per user for events in the logs after filtering. The top five event
codes, which are reiterated in Table 3.6, are now events that are exclusive
to user login behavior. We no longer see log off events, however. Event 4624
has been filtered out entirely. This indicates that the source, or sources, of
log off events were services, shares, or both. From what we saw in Table 3.4,
4624 accounted for 31.21% of empty string account names, as well. This
means we should expect to see a decline of at least 33,730,337 empty string
usernames, and 108,078,498 fewer overall events.
We also see that event 4648 (logon was attempted using explicit creden-
tials) is no longer encountered in the logs. This suggests that all 4648 events
were triggered by service or share accounts.
Events 4733, 4732, 4756, 4674, and 4757 in the top ten reveal that we have
not filtered out all administrative events. Since we have filtered out services
and shares, this indicates that the sources of these administrative tasks are
non-service and non-share accounts. This does not exclude the possibility
that the generation of these events is automated.
We find there are 121,834 unique users found in the week of time. This is
based on the two username fields only. The pre-filtered logs contained 302,510
unique users over the week, making a difference of 180,676 usernames. Table
3.7 contains the event codes that that contain empty-string usernames and
how many are encountered in the logs over the week.
In the filtered data, we see 35,507,152 TGTs were requested from 90,913
unique users, resulting in about 390.6 TGT requests per user with a uniform
distribution. This is 11,210,026 less total requests than before filtering.
In addition, there are 78,763,663 attempts to validate credentials (NTLM)
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Table 3.6: Top Ten EventCode Descriptions after Filtering
Event Code Description
4776 The domain controller attempted to validate the
credentials for an account
4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was re-
quested
4634 An account was logged off
4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed
4769 A Kerberos service ticket was requested
4733 A member was removed from a security-enabled
local group
4732 A member was added to a security-enabled local
group
4756 A member was added to a security-enabled uni-
versal group
4674 An operation was attempted on a privileged ob-
ject
4757 A member was removed from a security-enabled
universal group
coming from 91,315 unique users. This is 862.5 events per user with a uniform
distribution. This is a loss of 17,135,643 in terms of total NTLM authenti-
cation attempts.
In the filtered data, we see that Kerberos service tickets were requested
2,748,806 times from 288 unique users. This comes out to about 9544.4 ser-
vice tickets requested per user given a uniform distribution. This is 1,142,913
less total service tickets than the previous data set.
The maximum number of events from a single user in the filtered results
is 11,296,413. This is the same username that we found to have created the
most events in the non-filtered data, as well. Note that the number of events
produced by the same user this time is more than previously (a difference of
144,903). This could be an indication that the update to our anonymization
script is working as intended for this purpose. It may have previously not
credited this user with events the user actually produced, and now is. This
would explain the increase in events between scripts.
Notice also that the empty string is not the number one contributor any-
more. As we see in Table 3.7, we are still observing events that have empty
string usernames. The amount encountered is now fewer.
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Table 3.7: Number of EventCodes that Appear with Empty String
Username in the Filtered Logs













Figure 3.11 shows total user activity from midnight on November 1st to
midnight November 7th. Activity is again grouped into one hour bins. We
see a pattern of lower activity in the early morning, increasing activity over
the day that peaks around noon, and decreasing activity throughout the rest
of the day. We continue to see the repeated 2am spikes. The magnitudes of all
events are less than before. The daily noontime peaks are about 1.8 million
events now, while we previously saw noontime peaks of about 5 million. +
Figure 3.12 shows unique user activity over the same time period. Activity
is again grouped into one-hour bins. This follows the same trend as the non-
filtered graph, with reduced magnitude of events. We also see the 2am spikes
are no longer obvious in this view. We can see defined peaks for each day,
with the weekends having less activity.
Figure 3.13 shows the top five most seen event codes over time. Figure
3.14 shows the next five most frequent event codes over time. As mentioned
previously, the top five events are all related to account login activities. Recall
that event 4624 (logged on) has been filtered and so is no longer present.
Table C.2 in Appendix C lists the correlation coefficients calculated be-
tween each event code pair after filtering. We focus on the top ten events for
identifying correlation.
Event 4776 (DC attempted to validate credentials) and event 4768 (TGT
requested) have a correlation coefficient of 0.749.





























































All User Activity Over Time
Figure 3.11: User Activity over Time after Filter
appears to be the situation where they have differing magnitudes (about 3
times magnitude difference) but similar temporal trends.
Event 4769 has a correlation coefficient of 0.6735 with event 4776.
Events 4634 and 4776 have a correlation coefficient of 0.719. This may
indicate that a subset of credential validation and log off events occur in the
same hour time window.
There is a correlation coefficient of 0.665 between events 4768 and 4771
(Kerberos pre-authentication failed).
Events 4732 (A member was added to a security-enabled local group) and
4733 (A member was removed from a security-enabled local group) have a
correlation coefficient of 0.999.
Events 4732 and 4757 (A member was removed from a security-enabled
universal group) have a correlation coefficient of 0.657.
We see a seemingly uncharacteristic spike of event 4771 (pre-auth failure)
that occurs on Monday afternoon. When asked about this, Technology Ser-
vices noted that the spike was caused primarily by one staff user on one


































































All Unique User Activity Over Time
Figure 3.12: Unique User Activity over Time after Filter



























































































































































Figure 3.14: Top 6-10 Event Codes over Time after Filter
We now look at hourly usage graphs averaged over the week, illustrated
in Figure 3.15. The average barely falls below 600,000 events per hour at
its lowest points. There is a high point early in the morning at about 2am,
corresponding again to the daily peaks we saw previously. We see a trend of
activity increasing from early morning to about noon, followed by decreasing
activity.
The average daily unique user activity can be found in Figure 3.16. We
see a drop in magnitude of events, from the 500,000-2,000,000 range to the
25,000-50,000 range. The same users are responsible for multiple events per
hour. This graph makes the trend more apparent: lower in the morning
leading to an increase towards noon, and a slow decline as the afternoon
goes on.
Next we look at the frequency of user activity. Figure 3.17 shows the CDF
of user events over the week. On the x axis is a log-scale of the number of
times a user logs in. On the y axis is the frequency of logins. The markers
are every 10%. This tells us that about 5% of all users only create one event.
About 20% of users create 10 events or less. About 50% of users create 100
events or less. Over 85% of users create 1,000 events or less. About 99% of
users create 10,000 or less. The max number of logins from a single user was
46




















Figure 3.15: Average Daily Activity after Filter
11,296,413.
Figure 3.18 shows the PDF of user events over the week as a scatter plot.
The y axis is the number of times a user performs an event. The x axis is the
number of users that performed y number of events. Note that both axes are
log scaled. This plot resembles an exponential decay in the number of events
performed by users. The outliers are on the left end of the x axis. These
individual users are the source of far more events than the rest of the users.
3.4.6 User Distribution across Domain Controllers
We next characterize user activity distributed across the campus domain
controllers. We want to look at how many events are hitting each domain
controller over time. Figure 3.19 shows the total number of events that target
each domain controller over the week. Figure 3.20 illustrates the same but
limited to unique users. Both graphs are binned into 24 hour periods.
The majority of all traffic we see is going through the UDCs each day.
When considering only unique users, we see the same usage primarily through
47





















Average Daily Unique User Activity
Figure 3.16: Average Unique Daily Activity after Filter
the UDCs. When we compare the total and the unique, we notice that total
AWSDC and CDC traffic appears to be originating from fewer individuals.
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CDF of Num Times All Users Perform Event
Figure 3.17: CDF of Number of Times All Users Login after Filter
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In the future, it would be useful to build models of how an attacker would
move laterally in the network. We aim to gather data that an attacker
would look for in order to gain access to other resources on a network. This
includes, for example, Kerberos service tickets. We would assume that an
attacker has already compromised a computer on the network and has access
to a user account. The account may also have administrative privileges.
The computer’s memory would contain usernames, password hashes/keys,
TGTs, and service tickets. An attacker with sufficient access can retrieve
this information. The attacker can then use this information to authorize to
other computers or resources, thus successfully moving laterally in a network.
With information about service tickets, we could build attack models of
how an adversary could traverse a network. If we know how many service
tickets are distributed to shared computers (i.e., a computer lab desktop), we
can start to understand how many accounts could be impersonated through
stolen tickets. The number of accounts on shared computers alone could also
tell us how many account credentials could be stolen from hijacked hashes.
In addition, we want to look at user mobility. It would be beneficial to
know how user movement appears on the network. This includes spatial-
temporal movement. This would be useful for detecting lateral movement,
for example, because mobility would put constraints on where an attacker
could log in. A user should not normally be simultaneously logged in to
and active at two computer labs that are across a campus. It would also
be suspicious for a user to log out of one machine and immediately log in
to another machine located on the other side of campus. These could both
be indicators of an attacker attempting to use stolen credentials in order to
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move laterally in the network.
4.2 Conclusion
In this thesis, we analyzed Windows event logs produced at Active Direc-
tory domain controllers. The network we examined was a university campus
consisting of over 44,000 students and an additional 5,000 faculty and staff.
The logs were over a week of network activity. We characterized the activity
we saw from users, services, and shares. We described usage over a week,
detailed usage based on event codes encountered, looked at daily average
usage, and discussed distribution across the domain controllers. We then at-
tempted to filter out the services and shares to focus on user activity alone.
We repeated the previous analysis with the filtered data to gain additional
insight on network behavior without services and shares. We saw that ser-
vices and shares consist of a significant portion of network usage, including
some of the outlier behavior.
Some of the data cannot be seen by looking at user activity alone. We
saw that excluding services and shares also prevents us from seeing certain
correlations, such as login and logout events. At the same time, services and
shares can hinder us from seeing user activity by overshadowing users with
spikes of activity.
The data supports multiple trends which are now reiterated. On average,
the number of events created is lower in the early morning, increases towards
noon, and starts to decline in the mid afternoon. Fewer events are generated
on the weekend when compared to weekdays. In the filtered data, about
50% of users create 100 events or less and about 85% create 1,000 events or
less. Less than 5% of users create more than 10,000 events. In both filtered
and pre-filtered data, the top five events encountered are associated with
user sessions (i.e., login, logout, authentication) or Kerberos ticket requests.
Most events are generated at the Urbana Domain Controllers. The second
largest number of events (although about 15 times smaller) are generated at
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We needed to know the exact contents of the logs we would be analyzing. We
also needed to determine which fields in the log contained revealing informa-
tion that must be anonymized. We received a sample log from Technology
Services. This log contained information from only our NSRG lab volunteers.
Table A.1 contains descriptions of each field we encountered in the sample
log.
Table A.1: Field Descriptions
Name Description
Account Domain The domain
Account Name Name of account just authenticated (when re-
questing TGT)
Additional Information Unknown
Authentication Package Always “MICROSOFT AUTHENTICATION
PACKAGE V1 0”
Client Address IP address of user
Client Port Source (user) port
ComputerName Active Directory controller that received the re-
quest
Elevated Token Believed to be related to User Account Control
(network admin account)
Error Code Integer code to describe the reason for an error
EventCode Integer used to describe the event
EventType Unknown (empty or 0)
Group Domain Domain of affected group
Group Name Name of affected group




Key Length The length of the generated session key, will be
0 if no session key was requested.
Keywords Seems to be Windows verification point, always
“Audit Success”
Linked Logon ID Unknown, believed to be linked to Transited
Services
Logon Account Name of the account when NTLM authentica-
tion is used
Logon GUID Similar to Logon ID, but can potentially be cor-
related with event 4769 on Domain Controller
Logon ID Unique (between reboots) number for the logon
session. Can be used to correlate backwards to
logon event 4624
Logon Process Blank or “Advapi”
Logon Type How the user logged on, described below
NTLMErrCode Unknown
Network Account Domain Unknown (appears in 4624)
Network Account Name Unknown (appears in 4624)
Network Address Same as Source Network Address
OpCode Always “Info”
Package Name NTLM only Which version of NTLM is used
Pre Authentication Type Unknown
Privileges Names of admin-equivalent privileges of user at
logon
Process ID Executable process ID created from event 4688
Process Name Path of executable process created from event
4688
RecordNumber Identifier for this transaction. Not unique
across DCs
Restricted Admin Mode “Yes” for Remote Desktop Connections where
client specified this mode, “-” otherwise




Security ID SID of user account or affected group
Service ID Seems to always be empty
Service Name Always “krbtgt”
SourceName Always “Microsoft Windows security auditing.”
Source Network Address IP address of user’s computer but typically
empty
Source Port Source TCP port of logon request (random)
Source Workstation Name of computer where logon attempt origi-
nated
Supplied Realm Name Domain name of account
Target Server Name Appears to be empty or “localhost”
TaskCategory A brief string description of the event (not de-
tailed)
Ticket Encryption Type Unknown
Ticket Options Unknown
Transited Services Service acting on behalf of user for Kerberos au-
thentication (client authenticates with service
another way)
Type Name of directory service, always “Informa-
tion” for us
User ID SID of account used to login (TGT)
Virtual Account “Yes” when services are configured for this lo-
gon type, “No” otherwise
Workstation Name Computer name where user is physically
present. In our case, requests are made on be-
half of the user and so this becomes the DC
time Timestamp of when event was generated
host Active Directory controller that received the re-
quest
The EventCode fields listed in Table A.2 are integer codes used to describe
what event has occurred.
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Table A.2: EventCode Descriptions
Event Code Description
4624 An account was successfully logged on
4625 An account failed to log on
4634 An account was logged off 1
4647 User initiated logoff
4648 A logon was attempted using explicit creden-
tials
4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon
4673 A privileged service was called
4674 An operation was attempted on a privileged ob-
ject
4675 SIDs were filtered
4716 Trusted domain information was modified
4720 A user account was created
4722 A user account was enabled
4723 An attempt was made to change an accounts´
password
4724 An attempt was made to reset an accounts pass-
word
4725 A user account was disabled
4727 A security-enabled global group was created
4728 A member was added to a security-enabled
global group
4729 A member was removed from a security-enabled
global group
4731 A security-enabled local group was created
4732 A member was added to a security-enabled local
group
4734 A security-enabled local group was deleted
4735 A security-enabled local group was changed
4737 A security-enabled global group was changed
1“This event does not necessarily indicate the time that a user has stopped using a
system. For example, if the computer is shut down or loses network connectivity it may




4738 A user account was changed
4740 A user account was locked out
4755 A security-enabled universal group was changed
4756 A member was added to a security-enabled uni-
versal group
4757 A member was removed from a security-enabled
universal group
4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was re-
quested
4769 A Kerberos service ticket was requested
4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed
4776 The domain controller attempted to validate
the credentials for an account
4781 The name of an account was changed
4799 A security-enabled local group membership was
enumerated2
4904 An attempt was made to register a security
event source
4905 An attempt was made to unregister a security
event source
4907 Auditing settings on object were changed
4946 A change has been made to Windows Firewall
exception list. A rule was added
4948 A change has been made to Windows Firewall
exception list. A rule was deleted
4954 Windows Firewall Group Policy settings has
changed. The new settings have been applied
4985 The state of a transaction has changed
5038 Code integrity determined that the image hash
of a file is not valid
2“This event is valuable for catching so-called APT actors who are scoping out the
local accounts on a system they have compromised so that they extend their horizontal




5058 Key file operation
5059 Key migration operation
5136 A directory service object was modified
5137 A directory service object was created




B.1 Event Codes Before Filter
Table B.1 shows statistics about all event codes from all user activity over
the one week data set. It contains the event code, total times encountered,
individual users that have produced that event code, and the connections per
user (total/unique).
Table B.1: EventCode Frequency
EventCode Total Connections Users Connections Per
User
4624 108078498 6569653 16.45117299
4634 108059073 6516457 16.58248846
4776 95899306 4640444 20.66597636
4768 46717178 6830640 6.839355902
4672 37356928 17929 2083.603547
4771 16948020 406600 41.68229218
4648 13203323 246895 53.47748233
4769 3891719 31941 121.8408628
5136 779206 4219 184.6897369
4625 494143 36980 13.36243916
4673 323799 1897 170.6900369
4733 274763 52660 5.217679453
4732 272926 53684 5.083935623
4735 153498 289 531.1349481
4756 141359 74908 1.887101511
4755 139976 342 409.2865497
4674 110029 630 174.6492063
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Table B.1 Continued
EventCode Total Connections Users Connections Per
User
4675 57783 314 184.022293
4757 39153 20193 1.938939236
4740 37117 22597 1.642563172
4728 33561 15150 2.215247525
4737 30858 470 65.65531915
4738 5434 4801 1.131847532
4816 5244 277 18.93140794
4985 5128 646 7.938080495
4724 4954 4602 1.076488483
4723 1155 862 1.339907193
4729 1061 691 1.535455861
4722 1051 1026 1.024366472
4799 854 42 20.33333333
4907 633 1 633
4726 525 523 1.003824092
4781 439 49 8.959183673
4725 411 407 1.00982801
4720 380 376 1.010638298
4727 346 154 2.246753247
4904 198 65 3.046153846
4905 196 64 3.0625
4730 156 22 7.090909091
4754 113 38 2.973684211
4767 24 18 1.333333333
4731 23 11 2.090909091
4758 20 12 1.666666667
4954 14 2 7
4946 10 1 10
4948 10 1 10
5058 8 5 1.6
5061 8 5 1.6
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Table B.1 Continued
EventCode Total Connections Users Connections Per
User
5137 5 1 5
4734 4 2 2
4764 4 2 2
4716 3 3 1
4647 2 2 1
5059 2 1 2
5038 1 1 1
5141 1 1 1
B.2 Event Codes Encountered After Filter
Table B.2 is similar to Table B.1, but applied to the data gathered after
shares and services were filtered out.
Table B.2: EventCode Frequency After Filter
EventCode Total Connections Users Connections Per
User
4776 78763663 91315 862.5490117
4768 35507152 90913 390.5618778
4634 20675728 46444 445.1754371
4771 15566220 38394 405.4336615
4769 2748806 288 9544.465278
4733 270443 6507 41.56185646
4732 268594 6794 39.53400059
4756 140075 19313 7.252886657
4674 58864 1 58864
4757 38307 5422 7.065105127
4728 30506 11752 2.595813479
4737 29408 54 544.5925926
4672 22773 1 22773
4816 5289 1 5289
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Table B.2 Continued
EventCode Total Connections Users Connections Per
User
4729 1067 471 2.265392781
4755 774 30 25.8
5136 699 21 33.28571429
4735 137 13 10.53846154
4738 65 49 1.326530612
4781 53 17 3.117647059
4723 35 27 1.296296296
4985 24 1 24
4724 23 19 1.210526316
4767 22 13 1.692307692
4954 14 1 14
4727 13 9 1.444444444
4731 12 2 6
4754 12 3 4
4946 10 1 10
4948 10 1 10
4720 5 5 1
4722 5 5 1
4730 4 3 1.333333333
4764 4 2 2
4716 3 1 3
5058 2 1 2
5059 2 1 2
5061 2 1 2
4725 1 1 1
4734 1 1 1




C.1 Event Code Correlation Coefficients Before Filter
Table C.1 contains every combination of event code pairs and their correlation
coefficients. The correlation coefficients were calculated using the Pandas
(Python package) “coeff” function, which calculates the Pearson correlation
coefficient between two variables. The calculation takes into account the
time that the event occurred and amount of each event that occurred at that
time.
Table C.1: EventCode Correlation Coefficients Before Filter





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.2 Event Code Correlation Coefficients After Filter
Table C.2 is similar to Table C.1, but applied to the data gathered after
shares and services were filtered out.
Table C.2: EventCode Correlation Coefficients After Filter


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EventCode EventCode Correlation Coefficient
4716 4755 -1
4716 4756 -1
4716 4757 -1
4716 5136 -1
4720 4767 -1
4722 4767 -1
4729 4754 -1
4729 4764 -1
4733 4754 -1
4754 4757 -1
4754 4781 -1
4764 4768 -1
4764 4769 -1
4764 4771 -1
4764 4776 -1
4764 4816 -1
142
